China's reunification and international security in Northeast Asia: After Hong Kong what? by TANG, James T. H.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
3-1998
China's reunification and international security in
Northeast Asia: After Hong Kong what?
James T. H. TANG
Singapore Management University, jamestang@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/12265089808449729
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the Political
Science Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TANG, James T. H..(1998). China's reunification and international security in Northeast Asia: After Hong Kong what?. Global
Economic Review, 27(1), 119-131.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2162
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rger20
Download by: [Singapore Management University] Date: 20 June 2017, At: 00:07
Global Economic Review
ISSN: 1226-508X (Print) 1744-3873 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rger20
China's reunification and international security in
Northeast Asia: After Hong Kong what?
James T.H. Tang
To cite this article: James T.H. Tang (1998) China's reunification and international security
in Northeast Asia: After Hong Kong what?, Global Economic Review, 27:1, 119-131, DOI:
10.1080/12265089808449729
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/12265089808449729
Published online: 07 Apr 2008.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 49
View related articles 
Published in Global Economic Review, 1998 March, Volume 27, Issue 1, Pages 119-131
http://doi.org/10.1080/12265089808449729
GLOBAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 119
Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring 1998) pp. 119-131
CHINA'S REUNIFICATION AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA:
AFTER HONG KONG WHAT?
James T.H. Tang
University of Hong Kong
This paper examines the implications of Hong Kong's reunification with China on
cross-strait relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. It begins with a
discussion of the international security situation in the region and the increasing
importance of the People's Republic of China on regional security. The paper then
addresses the political and economic consequences of the sovereignty change over
Hong Kong on regional security, identifying the added strength to China on the one
hand, and the Special Administrative Region's moderating influences on the other.
Finally, it evaluates possible changes of the Beijing government's Taiwan policy. In
conclusion, the paper argues that China's reunion with Hong Kong may have far
reaching implications for regional security by enhancing China's national power as
well as injecting an element of uncertainty in cross-strait relations. However, domestic
developments and a more favourable international environment would facilitate the
eventual resolution of the Taiwan question peacefully.
1. INTRODUCTION
The importance of China's reunification as an issue in Northeast Asian international
security has been demonstrated in 1996 when tensions over the Taiwan Strait
intensified. The tensions were exemplified in mainland China's high-profile military
exercises and refusal to denounce the use of force as a possible solution to the
reunification question, the defiant attitude of the Nationalist government on Taiwan
under President Lee Teng-hui and the American involvement in the Taiwan
question. These are ingredients for a major military crisis which may de-stabilise the
region and disrupt economic activities. With the peaceful reunion of mainland China
and Hong Kong in July 1997, Taiwan has become the last reunification target of the
Beijing leadership.
The peaceful resolution of the Hong Kong question using the formula of "one
120 James T.H. Tang
country, two systems" has widely been seen as a welcoming development: China's
resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong ended one and a half century of national
humiliation, and provide a possible solution for the Taiwan problem. In fact, the
"one country, two systems" formula was first put forward by the Beijing leadership
to solve the Taiwan question.1
The Nationalist government in Taiwan, however, has consistently rejected
"one country, two systems" Hong Kong-style solution to Taiwan's reunification with
the mainland. While the leadership in Taiwan has still maintained its desire for the
ultimate reunification with the mainland, they have insisted that Taiwan has the right
to determine its own destiny. President Lee, for example, has repeatedly asserted that
Taiwan, in the form of the Republic of China, is an independent sovereign country
free from Beijing (Washington Post 1997; Times 1997). Taiwan authorities
described "one country, two systems" as "calls for a total surrender of the Republic
of China to mainland China" and rejected the formula as "neither feasible nor
acceptable for the Taiwan people" (Government Information Office of the Republic
of China 1997).
China's reunification is, strictly speaking, an internal matter, but tensions in
the Taiwan Strait would have serious consequences for regional security. The return
of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty has demonstrated that peaceful reunification is
possible, but the case of Taiwan is clearly different from Hong Kong. This paper is
an attempt to evaluate the implications of China's resumption of sovereignty over
Hong Kong on regional security with reference to the Taiwan question.
2. THE REGIONAL SECURITY MENU
Almost one decade after the end of the Cold War, scholars and practitioners remain
deeply divided on the security outlook of the East Asian region. The regional
security picture has given hopes and despair for lasting peace to both the realist and
liberal camps. Ralph A. Cosa and Jane Khanna (1997:221), for example, argued that
"the overall security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is as good as or better than it
has been at any time during this century." At the other end of the spectrum, Barry
Buzan (1994: 151) predicted an "escalation of military spending and arms rivalry" in
the context of a "region marked by many lines of hostility and ill-will, and virtually
unmediated by traditions and institutions for cooperation." Indeed, regional security
in the 1990s is marked by major crises over Korea, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and
conflicts in the South China Sea while the region somehow maintained stability and
peace in general. The uncertain security outlook in the region has generated a
multitude of proposals for a regional security framework and the usual scepticism.
The search for a common solution to international security in the East Asian
region is still continuing. I do not intend to add to the voluminous works on the
subject in this paper. The discourses about regional security and the complexities
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involved have been documented elsewhere (Kerr, Mack and Evans 1994; Evans
1994). In an attempt to provide a typology for the security challenges in the Asia-







6. Emergence of non-traditional concerns
According to Manning, the key immediate problem in the region is the possibility of
war, regional instability and a new regional nuclear race arising from events in the
Korean Peninsula. The long term concerns include the roles of three major regional
powers; China, Japan, and the U.S. The secondary concerns are those on territorial
disputes and sovereignty claims. These include disputes over the Spratlys, the
Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands, the Tak-do/Takeshima Islands, and tensions across the
Taiwan Strait. Latent tensions are those which arise from historic fears, suspicions,
and rivalries. Disquieting trends refer to increased military spending, and internal
strife and possible resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia. Finally,
non-traditional security concerns include piracy, environment problems, refugees,
and drug trafficking. While others have produced other lists or topologies of the
regional security picture, all security issues in the menu relate in one way or the other
to the intentions and behaviour of major regional players. China features
prominently in almost all security issues in the region—long and short terms.
Secondary concerns such as the Taiwan question can easily move up the ladder to
become a critical security issue with immediate consequence for regional security.
China's missile tests in waters near Taiwan in 1995/ 96 for example, has generated a
major crisis in the region.
3. THE RISE OF CHINA IN THE 1990S
Given China's geographic location, size, population, and rapidly rising economic
power, its role in East Asian security is obviously a matter which attracts major
regional and global attention since the beginning of the 1990s.
The Beijing leadership's suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations in
and around Tiananmen Square in 1989 has damaged China's international image and
created difficulties in Sino-Western relations. But once the Beijing government
restored political order and demonstrated its commitment to continuing economic
reform, the PRC gradually repaired the damages. The importance of the PRC as a
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major international player was highlighted during the Gulf crisis in 1990.2
International perceptions about the PRC, however, became far more complex in the
1990s.
The continuation of China's rapid economic growth prompted a re-evaluation
of its rising national power. According to the World Bank, China was the ninth
largest economy in the world in 1992 with a GNP of US$442.3 billion. Using
purchasing power parity, the International Monetary Fund ranked China as the
world's third largest economy in 1993. In fact, another report by the Economist in
October 1992 suggested that if the Chinese economy continues to grow steadily it
would become the world's largest economy in the next century. Although such
projection of China economic power has been questioned by more cautious analysts,
compared with other growth economies, China's record has been outstanding.
Between 1985 and 1992 China's real growth rate at 6.0 percent per annum placed it
in the 10th place in the world. As Susumu Yabuki suggested, China's ability to
sustain a high level of growth is particularly remarkable in comparison with other
top performers, which are inevitably much smaller in terms of population size.3 '
In 1996 China maintained strong real GDP growth at 9.7% and managed a
9.0% growth rate in the first three quarters of 1997. GDP growth target is set at 8%
for the whole year of 1997. Industrial growth was maintained at a healthy level of
13% in 1996 and 11% in January - September 1997 in real terms. In the first half of
1997, the added-value of output by state-owned enterprises grew by 5.5%, lower
than that of the collective-owned and private-owned enterprises which stood at
12.5% and 15.1%. The added-value of industrial output is expected to grow by
13.4% for the whole year of 1997. China's non-state sector has expanded rapidly and
experienced healthy development in recent years. The private sector also expanded
rapidly in China, confirming the trend towards higher liberalization and
marketization. The number of privately operated enterprises expanded more than six
times between 1990 and the end of 1995, reaching over six hundred thousand and
employed over fifty million workers. In 1996, over two-third of the nation's retail
consumer goods and more than half of China's industrial output were handled by
non-state enterprises (Hong Kong Trade Development Council 1997a).
The international orientation of the Chinese economy is also evident. The
country ranked as the 1 lth largest trading nation in the world (the 6th largest trading
nation if the EU countries were counted as one entity. In the first three quarters of
1997, China's total external trade increased by 13.7% over the same period of 1996
to almost two hundred and thirty billion US dollars. The Chinese government
expected that foreign trade will grow by 6.9% to reach more than three hundred
billion US dollars in 1997 (Ibid.).
Although economically dynamic China would offer exciting economic
opportunities for other countries and help promote economic growth in the region,
there are also concerns that a more powerful China would inject an element of
uncertainty into the calculus of regional security (Cable and Ferdinand 1994). As
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China's economic power grows, so will its military capacity. Growing Chinese
economic power, China's tarnished post-Tiananmen image, and involvement in
territorial disputes in the South China Sea have given rise to what has been popularly
described as the "China threat" theory (Roy 1994).
Arguments supporting the China threat thesis center around two major
themes. First, China is not contented with its current power position. As a result of
China's former dominance in the region in the form of the "Middle Kingdom" and its
subsequent humiliation in the hands of Western imperial powers the Chinese
leadership is strongly motivated to restore the glory of the Chinese empire.
Therefore, China is a non status quo power seeking regional domination and
becomes source of instability. This would clearly lead to profound implications for
international security in the region. Second, even if China does not seek regional
hegemony, its ascendancy would almost certainly upset existing power configuration
in the region, leading to more intense rivalry with other leading players in the region,
such as Japan and Indonesia—thus increasing the likelihood of military conflicts
over territorial disputes and regional instability. Summarizing the China threat thesis,
Denny Roy concluded that "current developments foretell an economically gigantic
China with a historic fear of foreigners, a distaste for cooperation, and an interest in
developing a blue-water navy and long range air combat capabilities." Roy (1994:
168) warned, "these may be the first signs of what will develop into the greatest
threat to the region's stability since the Pacific War."
China's willingness to use force in border disputes in the past, its
assertiveness against Taiwan during the island's 1996 presidential election, and the
shift of its strategic interests from a continent-based to a maritime-based orientation
have given support to the China threat thesis. The rise of China is further
complicated by the notion of Greater China—comprising of mainland China,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Economically greater China is already highly
interdependent with the mainland serving as the hinterland and manufacturing base
and Taiwan and Hong Kong serving as sources of capital and finance as well as
trade and marketing outlets. The reunification of China under a central government
may, therefore, have important consequences for regional security.
A united China which is powerful and democratic probably would be a
benign power and a source of stability, whereas a united China which is politically
intolerant and restless would almost become an aggressive power and a source of
regional instability. In many ways the direction of China's transformation is still not
entirely clear. There are signs that as China becomes economically more powerful,
the Chinese leadership is becoming more open and tolerant. Major social and
economic changes within China have loosen the Parry's political control. Limited
political, legal and institutional reforms have reduced the capacity of the arbitrary
party-state. Yet China still confronts major economic challenges, and its political
leadership is still not tolerant of political dissent.
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4. CHINA-HONG KONG REUNIFICATION
The reunification of Hong Kong with mainland China has clearly enhanced China's
national prestige and overall power. Economic links between Hong Kong and the
mainland have been very strong. In many ways Southern China and Hong Kong
have formed an integrated economy.
As one of the four Asian dragons, it is the 7th largest trader (4th if the EU is
regarded as one entity) and the 9th largest exporter of services. Hong Kong's
economic strength and dynamism is widely recognized. Hong Kong has been
credited as the freest and the most service-oriented economy with the highest per
capita income (in terms of domestic buying power) in Asia. It has been ranked as the
world's 2nd most competitive economy, with 2nd highest per capita holding of
foreign exchange, and named Asia's 2nd least-corrupted economy. It is the world's
4th largest source of foreign direct investment. It is also a major transportation and
financial centre and a key regional business hub.
Despite the political differences between the British administration in Hong
Kong and the mainland authorities, they had enjoyed close economic and social
relationships. While the "one country, two systems" provided the basis for Hong
Kong to maintain its autonomy and status as a separate customs territory, China's
economic position has been enhanced by the reunification of Hong Kong. In the
words of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, "Hong Kong has long been
mainland China's window to the world—a strategic gateway to foreign business
contacts, modem technology and investment." According to a TDC report, over 800
sailings, 100 flights, 35 trains, and 26,000 vehicles move across the Hong Kong-
China border everyday. Hong Kong is also the most important entreport for
mainland China and about half of mainland China's exports are channelled through
Hong Kong. Most of Hong Kong's total re-exports of about one hundred and fifty
billion US dollars were either originated from or destined for mainland China.
China's Customs statistics put Hong Kong as its third largest trading partner,
accounted for 16% of the country's total trade in the first seven months of 1997.
Hong Kong contributes to about one-third of mainland China's foreign exchange
earnings annually. Over half of the 284,000 foreign-funded projects in mainland
China, by the end of 1996, were linked to Hong Kong interests. Between 1979 and
1996, Hong Kong concluded over two hundred billion US dollars of investment
contracts in the mainland, more than half of the total contracted foreign direct
investment in mainland China. Actually utilised capital from Hong Kong reached
almost US$100 billion, which was over half of the total amount of capital invested
by foreign companies in mainland China (Hong Kong Trade Development Council
1997b).
Mainland China has also become a leading investor in Hong Kong. The
number of mainland-backed enterprises registered in Hong Kong was 1,756, with an
estimated total asset value of more than US$40 billion by late-1994. The Bank of
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China and its 12 sister banks are now the second largest banking group in Hong
Kong, after Hongkong Bank. In 1994 the Bank of China also started to issue Hong
Kong dollar banknotes. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the
Agricultural Bank of China and the People's Bank of Construction of China—have
all opened their first branch operations in Hong Kong. Altogether 18 Chinese banks
are operating in Hong Kong (Ibid.).
Reunification has made closer economic cooperation and better coordination
easier. The new leadership of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Government
under Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has maintained that the basis for the
successful implementation of the "one country, two systems" formula is the shared
common interests of the mainland and Hong Kong, and new mechanisms have been
established to facilitate the coordination of infra-structural projects and economic
and business collaborations (Tung 1997).
The emergence of an economically much more powerful China, however, is
only one dimension of the reunification formula. By bringing Hong Kong under the
political orbit of mainland China, the Beijing government has strengthened its
strategic position in the region, too. British Hong Kong was not of major importance
in the Chinese global strategic calculations, especially since the 1970s when China's
international security became much more favourable following the improvement of
Sino-US relations. Towards the end of British colonial rule, British military presence
in the territory was reduced to less than ten thousand, but it has remained active. The
Hong Kong harbour also provided convenient facilities for Western warships in the
region, which under NATO arrangements could dock without charges. British forces
in Hong Kong had regularly been involved with military exercises under the Five
Power defence Agreement (Britain, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New
Zealand). The relocation of Hong Kong from the Western camp to China's side
represented a shift in the strategic equation to China's favour.4
According to the Sino-British agreement over Hong Kong, China is
responsible for the defence of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The
People's Liberation Army is stationed in the territory. The Chinese government has
deployed only a few thousand troops to the Special Administrative Region, but it is
supported by military presence across the border in Shenzhen. Under an agreement
with the British, the Chinese acquired former British military sites in the territory.
The PLA also acquired a new naval base on Stonecutters Island in the middle of the
Hong Kong harbour with modern facilities. The base would provide east assess for
larger frigates from the Chinese fleet and provide support for other Chinese Naval
activities. While the Chinese government is unlikely to involve Hong Kong in
military conflicts over territorial disputes in the South China Sea or confrontation
with Taiwan, Hong Kong would provide a useful coordinating point between the
Shanghai-based East China fleet and the Zhanjiang-based South China Sea Fleet.
Overall, China has enhanced its coastal defence and increased its capability in its
military projection in the East Asian region (Tang 1997: 87-92).
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The reunification with Hong Kong, however, also brings new constraints.
The Chinese government would need to consider the implications of military
confrontation on Hong Kong's development as a major economic and
communication centre. How to accommodate the existence of a more pluralistic
society with different political values and attitudes in the much larger and rigid
political framework even with the "one country, two systems" arrangement is not an
easy task. As a step in the eventual reunification, whether "one country, two system"
would prove successful or not may also be critical.
5. TENSIONS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Mainland China's assertiveness over the Taiwan issue in 1995/ 96 demonstrated the
volatility of cross-strait relations. A direct military confrontation with or without the
involvement of the US would have serious consequences for regional stability and
economic prosperity. Would mainland China's reunification with Hong Kong
facilitate a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question? Byron Weng (1997: 54) has
identified six stages in cross-strait relations.
1.1949-58: tense cold war
2.1959-71: relaxed, stalemate cold war
3.1971-78: closed competition in a state of nominal cold war
4.1979-87: Beijing's unilateral overtures for negotiations and
open competition
5.1987-mid 1990s: open competition and partial cooperation
6.1991-mid 1990s: informal negotiations
Until the 1970s, the rival regimes of the People's Republic of China on the mainland
and the Republic of China of Taiwan engaged in open hostility and occasionally
direct military friction. In 1971 when the nationalist regime on Taiwan was unseated
in the UN, the contention for international recognition quickly ended in favour of the
PRC. From 1979 onward, the PRC has put forward the "one country, two systems"
formula for national reunification with Taiwan. Under this formula, the island is to
maintain a degree of autonomy with its own system intact but would have to become
a local government within the united China under the leadership of a central
government in Beijing. The Nationalist government has counter-proposed a "one
country, two governments" formula, insisting on equal status and reciprocity. Their
disagreement resulted in a stalemate.
Since the 1980s, economic interactions between the two, as a result of
mainland China's outward-looking economic strategy and Taiwan's economic
development, created the need for a more active approach to manage economic and
social interactions between the two sides. In 1990 Taipei established a National
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Unification Council (NUC) for setting mainland's policy direction, a Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC) for the implementation of such policies, and a government-
sponsored private organization, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to serve as an
intermediary organization for contact and negotiations with mainland authorities.
The mainland had its policy making body in the form of a leading group on Taiwan
Affairs for policy making in 1989, and a Taiwan Affairs Office under the State
Council, as well as the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)
for contact and negotiations with Taiwan.
In the early 1990s, both sides had issued policy papers explaining their
positions. The leaders from both sides had issued policy statements putting forward
their visions of how to resolve their differences. The mainland position was issued in
the form of the Jiang (Jemian) eight points, which maintained the one China
principle and commitment not to use force against Taiwan unless the island moves
towards independence or foreign parties become involved in the Taiwan issue. Lee
Teng-hui responded be insisting that Taiwan had to be treated as an equal and
demanded the mainland to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. While the two
sides were not able to narrow their differences, their tones were conciliatory. The
situation, however, changed from the mid 1990s onward. First, the demand for
Taiwan's independence has increased following political liberalization on the island.
Second, the Nationalist government decided to raise its international profile and
expand its "international space". Cross-strait relations deteriorated rapidly after Lee
Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. in 1995. The mainland suspended talks with Taiwan and
launched a series of personal attacks on Lee in its official publication, the People's
Daily. Prior to the first direct presidential elections in Taiwan, the PLA launched
missiles in Taiwan waters and carried out massive military exercises, prompting the
U.S. to send aircraft carrier into the area. Undeterred by the mainland's military
action, Lee was elected with a clear mandate. Tensions in the Strait eased somewhat
in 1996, but the talks have not been resumed and the two sides are still competing
intensely internationally.
The impact of Hong Kong's reunion with the mainland on cross-strait
relations can be viewed from different perspectives. Internationally, hopes that a
successful and peaceful reunion between Hong Kong and the mainland may offer a
Taiwan solution have proved to be unrealistic. Leaders in Taiwan have made clear
their positions that the Hong Kong solution is not applicable to Taiwan. It is too
early to judge whether the "one country, two systems" formula can be implemented
successfully or not in Hong Kong. But the Lee Teng-hui leadership in Taiwan has
rejected the mainland government's position of "peaceful reunification" using the
formula.
For the Beijing authorities, reunification with Taiwan clearly has become the
next major target after Macau, which is due to become another Special
Administrative Region in 1999. Wu Guogang, a China observer who had served as
an aide to former Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, suggested that the return of Hong
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Kong to Chinese sovereignty would have major impact on Beijing's Taiwan policy.
He identified six new factors in Beijing's post-Hong Kong Taiwan policy (Wu
1997).
1. Political factor




The first factor concerns the rising nationalistic feelings in the mainland associated
with the end of foreign domination in China. Wu observed that the end of British
colonial rule in Hong Kong was seen as a symbol of China's rise and a crucial stage
in the ultimate reunification of China. Such sentiments, reinforced by the growing
nationalistic feelings of the people as China becomes more powerful and more
assertive internationally, would inject a new emotional element into the mainland's
Taiwan policy. Mainland authorities would become less tolerant of international
involvement in the Taiwan issue and more impatient for delays in the reunification
process.
The policy agenda factor refers to the mainland's time-table for reunification.
Wu suggested that the successful reunion with Hong Kong has provided an impetus
and opportunity for a new time-table to resolve the Taiwan question. He predicted
that the mainland leadership probably would like to see reunification achieved in 10
to 15 years, i.e., between 2007 to 2012.
Wu made his prediction based on analysis of the political, economic, and
international situations after Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty. He
maintained that the Hong Kong case would have a demonstrative effect on the
mainland-Taiwan reunification process. If the mainland-Hong Kong reunion proved
to be smooth and successful, it clearly would strengthen Beijing's political position.
First, it would provide a model for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.
Second, it would help secure international sympathy and support for the mainland.
Third, it would influence public opinion in Taiwan. Finally, it would make military
actions against Taiwan more justifiable.
The fourth factor concerns Hong Kong's role in the economic relations
between the mainland and Taiwan. Hong Kong has always been a major economic
link between the two. Through Hong Kong, Wu further suggested, the mainland
could also strengthen its economic relations with Taiwan and build up more people-
to-people visits, communication, exchanges, and cooperation.
The mainland would be able to use Hong Kong's international importance to
step up its effort in isolating Taiwan diplomatically. Countries with diplomatic links
with Taiwan, for example, has come under pressure from mainland authorities in
their negotiations for maintaining their presence in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's
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memberships in many international organizations would also strengthen Beijing's
position vis-a-vis Taiwan.
Finally, Wu maintained that China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong
Kong and later Macau would, in general, boost its military position in the South
China Sea. While Hong Kong itself may not be militarily important, its return to the
orbit of Beijing has shifted the strategic balance in the region to the mainland's
favour. This would greatly enhance the credibility of Beijing's military threat.
6. CONCLUSION
China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, however, is also a major
challenge for the Beijing leadership. China would need to demonstrate to the world
that it is capable of managing a vibrant and pluralistic society according to the terms
that it declared. As Michael Yahuda (1996:142) argued, the reversion of sovereignty
of Hong Kong to China is "a challenge not only to the people and institutions of
Hong Kong," but also "a profound test to the adaptability of the leaders, the
institutions and people of China itself." Whether mainland and Taiwan could find a
peaceful solution to resolve their differences partly depends on how well the Beijing
leadership meets this challenge.
The government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has
declared that things in Hong Kong have remained unchanged after the reversion of
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. The Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and his
senior officials have all declared "business as usual". The reunion with Hong Kong
may have far reaching implications for regional security by enhancing China's
national power as well as injecting an element of uncertainty in cross-strait relations.
Domestic developments on both sides and the international environment
would also alter the framework of cross-strait relations. Improvements in mainland
China's relations with the U.S. following the Jiang-Clinton Summit towards the end
of 1997, for example, may have weakened Taiwan's international position, but at the
same time, it would help the establishment of a more stable situation in the Taiwan
Strait. In the longer run, regional security arrangements may also facilitate a better
environment for the eventual resolution of the Taiwan question.
Notes
1
 The "one country, two systems" concept, described by the former British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher as the "stroke of genius", clearly stems from the pragmatism of Deng
Xiaoping who also created the special economic zones in China in 1979. The substance of
the concept is borrowed from the nine principles of Ye Jianyiing, which formed the basis of
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Beijing's Taiwan policy in the early 1980s. See Thatcher (1993: 493) and Wong (1997: 18).
2
 For an analysis of China's position during the 1990 Gulf crisis see Huo (1992).
3
 For a solid review of China's economic development see Yabuki (1995).
4
 For a discussion of Hong Kong's strategic role as a British territory see Tang (1997: 84-6).
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